By the time this special issue appears in print, President Obama will have enjoyed his fi rst hundred days in offi ce. Whatever the outcome of his fi rst administration, his election has been widely welcomed as a sign that the American electorate (or at least a proportion of those who voted) has been willing not only to elect the fi rst African-American to the Oval Offi ce but also to reject President Bush's aggressive policies overseas. And it is possible, as Joseph Nye ( 2008 : xi) noted before the 2008 presidential election, that Obama's personal charisma may well be a very important part of rehabilitating America's soft power. President Obama faces some tough challenges ranging from the fate of the international economic order to regional issues including the long-running Israeli-Palestinian dispute and the nature of Iran's nuclear status within the region. On top of that, we would have to add policy-related challenges over the future stability of Iraq and Afghanistan alongside relations with other states such as Syria. Such is the expectation surrounding the Obama administration that he and his team, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, will inevitably disappoint supporters hoping for radical changes within a four-or even eight-year time frame.
One of the greatest obstacles facing the United States in the post-Bush era is its public reputation in the world and in particular the Middle East. Repairing America's reputation in the Middle East, and the Islamic world more generally, will take time and a great deal of judicious public diplomacy. Fortunately, for President Obama, the last administration provided a great number of examples of how not to engage in effi cacious public diplomacy. Th ese include the so-called 2001-2 'Shared Values' campaign, which saw the Department of State embark on an initiative designed to show the world that Muslim Americans enjoyed a decent life in places like Dearborn, Michigan. Unfortunately, for most Muslim observers, their anger at America was not because of what was occurring in the Mid-West but in the West Bank. Th e decision to fund international broadcasting enterprises such as Radio Sawa and Al-Hurra television were less than successful not least because Americanfunded media channels enjoy little to no credibility with key audiences in
